

# Philosophy of Logic and Language

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# 1 Overview

Week	Topic
1	The Linguistic Turn
2	Descriptions
3	Rigid Designation
4	Meaning
5	Truth
6	Conditionals
7	Vagueness
8	Modality

In this course, we will think about some of the central topics in the philosophy of language and in philosophical logic. These topics were particularly prominent in philosophy during the 20th century, but their importance endures to today. The topics are also ones that will make you a better philosopher generally, if you engage with them in the right way. But they aren't easy. The Philosophy of Logic and Language is, in my opinion, one of the FHS papers. It's rigorous and requires careful and systematic thinking. But along with challenges, it can also bring great rewards.

The first part of the course is given over to thinking about questions in the philosophy of language. We will begin by looking at Frege's distinction between sense and reference, which paved the way for thinking about the philosophy of language to come. From there, we will consider Russell's theory of descriptions and the semantic content of the word 'the' along with questions of how names come to refer to what they do and how sentences get the meanings that they have.

With that in hand, we'll turn our attention to some issues in philosophical logic. In philosophical logic, we will be interested in some of the concepts acquired during the *Introduction to Logic* course, though we'll be taking a different approach to them. Instead of using formal techniques of propositional and predicate logic, we will be thinking about why we use the techniques that we use. We'll start by thinking about the truth table for conditional if, then statements. We'll think about different ways of approaching conditional statements and then move onto challenges to the adequacy of propositional and predicate logic, coming from vagueness and modality respectively.

## 2 Website

I'll post the materials for these tutorials on my website as we go along. They can be downloaded at:

[www.stephenwrightphilosophy.com](http://www.stephenwrightphilosophy.com) on the right-hand side of the page under the 'Philosophy of Logic and Language' link. Just be sure to use the link under 'Trinity 2015!'

## 3 A Note on the Reading List

For each class I've identified two different types of reading. Readings marked as required are exactly that – they're readings you just have to do. Some of these are hard, but don't worry, we can discuss anything that you don't understand in tutorials. After this, there are some further readings. These you will want to look at in your own time, possibly after the tutorial (or maybe before) and they will help develop your thinking on these subjects further. For the purposes of the tutorial essay, however, I'd like you to focus particularly carefully on the readings that I've identified as required for the class. This is *not* to say that all of the readings for each week will be relevant to every essay for that week. You'll have to use (and develop) your judgement for working out what is and isn't useful in each case. But it is to say that you should read those required readings particularly carefully because I'll be expecting you to know about them in advance of the tutorial.

† denotes required reading.

\* denotes background reading.

Lastly, don't be shy about asking me if you find any of the readings hard to get hold of. If you can't find any of the readings, I'll either email you a PDF of it or else replace it on the reading list with something that can be found or sent.

## 4 Doing Philosophy

During your time doing philosophical work, you'll want to read things that aren't on the reading lists. And it's really important that what you read is good quality. It's very easy to waste a lot of time and energy in philosophy reading stuff that just isn't helpful. If you read stuff from poor sources, you're liable to wind up confused or misinformed. You want to be reading things that are written by people who have, at the very least, more philosophical

experience than you. In the case of several sources, though, there's no filtering or checking to make sure that this is the case. Obviously, the reading lists provided by the faculty are a great place to look. But even they don't contain *everything*. With that in mind, here are some guidelines for you to get you started. As always, do get in touch and ask me if you find yourself in any doubt at all.

Some good places to start your reading are:

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy at <http://plato.stanford.edu> is an excellent resource. It gives you an overview of some of the topics that we'll be working on and also comes with a useful bibliography, all of which is of an appropriate quality for you to be using.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy at <http://www.iep.utm.edu/> is another excellent online philosophy encyclopedia. Like the Stanford Encyclopedia, its entries are reviewed before they are published and also have useful suggestions for further reading.

Philpapers at <http://www.philpapers.org> is an online collection of philosophy articles that can be searched by category. There are some excellent articles on here and the site is a useful way of finding things to read. This site requires some caution, though. Unlike the above two, anyone can add their papers, regardless of whether or not they have actually been published in journals, or are ever going to be! As a rule of thumb, if you can't see publication details for a paper on this site, then proceed with caution. This notwithstanding, it is an excellent and important source.

Google Scholar at <http://scholar.google.co.uk/> is a relatively recent research tool and one that's extremely useful. The best thing that you can use Google Scholar for is finding papers that are relevant to what you've been reading. If you run a search for a paper that you've just read, Google Scholar will help throw up any papers that have cited the paper you searched for. This is extremely useful for helping you figure out where to go next. As with PhilPapers, however, there's no quality filter, so if you are in any doubt about what you've found (as with any of the above resources) feel free to ask me first. Lastly, note that this *is* an acceptable use of Google's resources, where searching for philosophers or themes and then reading what you find absolutely is *not*. Likewise, stay off looking for things on Wikipedia.

## 5 Preliminary Reading

Anything on the reading list would be a good thing to look at before getting started on the course. For those wanting a particularly good introductory

reading to the course as a whole, however, the following would be particularly suitable:

Mark Sainsbury (1998) 'Philosophical Logic' in A.C. Grayling (ed.), *Philosophy 1: A Guide Through the Subject* Oxford: Oxford University Press pp. 61-122.

This piece doesn't cover everything that we'll discuss in the course and there are parts of Sainsbury's piece that we won't discuss. But reading the entirety of the piece is useful nonetheless for getting an overview of the kind of things that we'll be talking about.

## 6 Tutorial 1 – The Linguistic Turn

As a way into the philosophy of language, we will look at theories developed by Locke and Frege. According to Locke, when I talk about an object, what I strictly and literally talk about is my *idea* of that object. And when you talk about an object, strictly and literally, you talk about your *idea* of the object. This generates immediate concerns over how we can come to be talking about the same object. But if our speech simply refers directly to the object, this brings its own problems. In this tutorial, we will look at Frege's way of seeking to resolve these difficulties.

### 6.1 Readings

- † John Locke (1689). *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* Indiana: Hackett. Book III, Chapters 1&2.
- † Gottlob Frege (1892). 'On Sense and Reference' in Peter Geach and Max Black (eds.), *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*.
- \* E.J. Lowe (1995). *Locke on Human Understanding* London: Routledge. Chapter 7.
- \* Norman Kretzmann (1968). 'The Main Thesis of Locke's Semantic Theory' *Philosophical Review* 77 (2):175-196.
- \* Anthony Kenny (1995). *Frege: An Introduction to the Founder of Modern Philosophy* London: Penguin. Chapter 7.
- \* John McDowell (1977). 'On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name' *Mind* 86 (342):159-185.
- \* Michael Dummett (1973). *Frege's Philosophy of Language* New York: Harper & Row. Chapter 5.

*Question: What are the puzzles that Frege identifies and how does his theory seek to solve them?*

## 6.2 Study Questions

- (1) What is the function of language according to Locke?
- (2) What is it that Locke thinks that language communicates?
- (3) Is it correct to say that Locke takes words to mean Ideas?
- (4) Why might there be a problem of communication on Locke's view?
- (5) What part(s) of Locke's theory could we change to avoid this difficulty?
- (6) In what sense are words the basic components of language?
- (7) What is meant by the *unity of the proposition* and in what way(s) might Locke's theory struggle to account for it?
- (8) How does Frege's theory differ from Locke's?
- (9) Why does Frege reject the idea that the meaning of words are Ideas?
- (10) Are words or sentences basic in terms of meaning?
- (11) Why might there be a difficulty with Frege's idea that singular terms refer to objects, but concepts don't?
- (12) Why can't meaning be aligned with reference?
- (13) How does an appeal to *sense* solve Frege's puzzle?
- (14) How does Frege seek to account for singular terms that do not refer?
- (15) What is the challenge of belief reports to Frege's view?
- (16) How are Fregean *Thoughts* different to Lockean *Ideas*?
- (17) What is required for people to think the same thought, on Frege's view?
- (18) Is Frege correct in thinking that statements involving singular terms presuppose the existence of what they purport to refer to?



## 7 Tutorial 2 – Descriptions

We saw in the first tutorial that Frege identifies certain puzzles concerning meaning and language that arise from expressions that have the same referent. Russell was reluctant to adopt a notion of sense, but instead took expressions that do not refer to anything like ‘the King of France is bald’ to be false since they are understood in terms of making an existential claim about something that does not exist. This view is contested by Strawson, who claims that statements of the form ‘the King of France is bald’ to lack meaning altogether, rather than being false. Donnellan offers a distinction that promises to resolve this disagreement.

### 7.1 Readings

- † Bertrand Russell (1905). ‘On Denoting’ *Mind* 14 (56):479-493.
- † P.F. Strawson (1950). ‘On Referring’ *Mind* 59 (235):320-344.
- † Keith Donnellan (1966). ‘Reference and Denote Descriptions’ *The Philosophical Review* 75 (3):218-304.
- \* Marga Reimer (1992). ‘Incomplete Descriptions’ *Erkenntnis* 37 (3):347-363.
- \* Bertrand Russell (1957). ‘Mr. Strawson on Referring’ *Mind* 66 (263):385-389.
- \* Murali Ramachandran (1993). ‘A Strawsonian Objection to Russell’s Theory of Descriptions’ *Analysis* 53 (4):209-212.
- \* Scott Soames (2010). *Philosophy of Language* Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 1.2.

*Question: Does Russell give an adequate account of the semantic contribution of the word ‘the’ when followed by a singular noun phrase?*

## 7.2 Study Questions

- (1) What is the difference between the *surface grammar* of a sentence and the *logical form* of a sentence?
- (2) In addition to Frege's puzzles, what puzzles does Russell's theory purport to solve?
- (3) How does Russell's theory treat the following:
  - (a) Informative identity statements?
  - (b) Belief attributions?
  - (c) Statements of the form *the King of France is bald*?
  - (d) Statements about fictional objects?
- (4) What are the shortcomings of Russell's distinguishing between *wide* and *narrow* scope?
- (5) Is a statement such as *the King of France is bald* meaningful?
- (6) How plausible is Strawson's idea that it is people, not expressions that refer to things?
- (7) Why does context-sensitivity make trouble for Russell's theory?
- (8) Can the problem be solved by restricting the domain of quantification?
- (9) What is Donnellan's distinction between an *attributive* use of a description and a *referential* use of a description?
- (10) Analyse the following in terms of Donnellan's distinction:

“...Another point about her is that she isn't my wife.”

“True. Very few people are Kitty.”

“It isn't Kitty she isn't, you bloody fool. What she isn't is my wife. Not the same thing at all...” (Lycan, taken from Kingsley Amis).

Which are instances of the attributive use and which are instances of the referential use?

- (11) How might Russell seek to defend the theory of descriptions against the observations made by Strawson and Donnellan?

## 8 Tutorial 3 – Rigid Designation

In this tutorial, we'll be looking at what might well be the most influential work of 20th century analytic philosophy. In *Naming and Necessity*, Saul Kripke presented some powerful arguments against the idea that names come to be associated with the things they refer to by being shorthand for descriptions. Rather, Kripke developed a theory according to which an initial 'baptism' attaches names to objects and later uses of the name come to refer to the same object in virtue of being connected in the right way to that initial baptism. We'll look at the details of Kripke's discussion and some more general extensions of it to the domain of natural kind terms.

### 8.1 Readings

- † Saul Kripke (1972). *Naming and Necessity* Malden: Blackwell.
- † Hilary Putnam (1973). 'Meaning and Reference' *Journal of Philosophy* 70:699–711.
- \* Gareth Evans (1973). 'The Causal Theory of Names' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume* 47:187–208.
- \* David Wiggins (1994). 'Putnam's Doctrine of Natural Kinds and Frege's Doctrines of Sense, Reference, and Extension: Can They Cohere?' in Peter Clark and Bob Hale (eds.), *Reading Putnam*, 201–215. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- \* D. H. Mellor (1977). 'Natural Kinds' *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 28 (4):299-312.
- \* John Searle (1958). 'Proper Names' *Mind* 67 (266):166-173.
- \* A. D. Smith (2005). 'Natural Kind Terms: A Neo-Lockean Theory' *European Journal of Philosophy* 13 (1):70-88.

*Question: How is it that I come to use the name 'Plato' to refer to a pet tortoise, where you use the name 'Plato' to refer to the philosopher?*

## 8.2 Study Questions

- (1) How does the idea of names as definite descriptions feature in Russell's theory?
- (2) What are Kripke's arguments against Russell's theory of names based on *modality*, *ignorance* and *error*?
- (3) Does Searle's "cluster theory" fare any better than Russell's description theory in terms of responding to Kripke's arguments?
- (4) What is the difference between *rigid* and *non-rigid* designation?
- (5) If names are rigid designators, what implications does this have for the relationship between the necessary and the *a priori*?
- (6) How does Kripke think that my use of the name 'Plato' might refer to my friend's tortoise but your use might refer to the philosopher?
- (7) Suppose I might not have existed. How do we make sense that my name refers to the same thing in all possible worlds given this possibility?
- (8) Is the possibility of mis-baptising something a problem for Kripke's theory?
- (9) Does the thesis that names are rigid designators depend on the truth of Kripke's causal theory of names?
- (10) What are natural kind terms?
- (11) How does a Lockean account of language treat natural kind terms?
- (12) "[M]eanings" just ain't in the *head*' [PUTNAM]. Discuss.
- (13) What is the point of Putnam's "Twin Earth" thought experiment?
- (14) Could we have something approaching a Lockean view of natural kinds without individualism about meanings?
- (15) Is there a problem with the idea that we might divide linguistic labour and defer to experts that do not currently exist?

## 9 Tutorial 4 – Meaning

If I tell you that *Jesus College has some of the finest philosophers anywhere in the world*, then you can understand what I'm saying even if you don't think that it's true and hasn't been said by anyone before. You understand what I say because you pick up on the *meaning* of what I say. In this class, we'll look at what causes statements to have the words that they do. According to one approach, meaning comes from the intentions that speaker have when they say certain things. According to another approach, this by itself isn't all that there is to meaning.

### 9.1 Readings

- † H.P. Grice (1957). 'Meaning' *The Philosophical Review* 66:377–388.
- † Donald Davidson (1967). 'Truth and Meaning' *Synthese* 17:304–323.
- † P.F. Strawson (1971). 'Meaning and Truth' in P.F. Strawson (ed.), *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, 60-86. London: Methuen.
- \* Anita Avramides (1997). 'Intentions and Convention' in Bob Hale and Crispin Wright (eds.), *A Companion to the Philosophy of Language*, 60–86. Oxford: Blackwell.
- \* Alfred Tarski (1944). 'The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics' *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 4 (3):341–75.
- \* H.P. Grice (1989). 'Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning' in H.P. Grice (ed.), *Studies in the Ways of Words* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- \* Scott Soames (2003). *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume 2: The Age of Meaning*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Part 4.
- \* P. F. Strawson (1964). Intention and Convention in Speech Acts. *Philosophical Review* 73 (4):439-460.

*Question: What, if anything, do speaker intentions have to do with the meaning of sentences?*

## 9.2 Study Questions

- (1) How does Grice analyse speaker meaning in terms of a speaker's intentions?
- (2) How does Grice analyse sentence meaning in terms of speaker meaning?
- (3) What is the difference between *natural meaning* and *non-natural meaning*?
- (4) How do conventions and standard procedures ground sentence meaning, according to Grice's theory?
- (5) Sometimes I might say something without intending you to believe me, such as in an exam. How should Grice and Davidson make sense of this?
- (6) How do words get their meaning on Grice's view?
- (7) What is Davidson's truth-conditional theory of meaning?
- (8) What are *meaning facts*? How does Davidson's theory make sense of meaning facts?
- (9) Commands and questions don't have truth-conditions. Can Davidson's theory make sense of them as having meanings?
- (10) What is *compositionality* (in terms of the meaning of sentences)?
- (11) How might Davidson's account make sense of indexical statements?
- (12) Some people think that moral statements, such as *killing is wrong* don't have truth conditions, since they're just expressions of emotions. If these people are correct, does this make problem for the Davidson's theory, given that these kinds of statements can be meaningful?
- (13) Is it correct to say that without a theory of truth, Davidson doesn't offer us a theory of meaning?
- (14) How does Davidson's account of meaning connect with Tarski-sentences?

## 10 Tutorial 5 – Truth

In this tutorial, we will think about how we should understand the concept of truth. It's certainly fair to say that both logic and language are taken with the idea that truth is philosophically significant, but we will think about how we should understand what it is for a statement to be true. According to *deflationary* approaches, to say that a statement is true is not to add anything much to that statement at all. According to *correspondence* theories, to say that something is true is to say that it matches up to the world in a particular way. We will investigate these issues through three famous works of the twentieth century, by Austin, Ramsey and Strawson respectively.

### 10.1 Readings

- † J. L. Austin (1950). 'Truth' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 24 (1):111-29.
- † P. F. Strawson (1949). 'Truth' *Analysis* 9 (6):83-97.
- † F. P. Ramsey (1927). 'Facts and Propositions' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 7 (1):153-170.
- \* Paul Horwich (1990). *Truth* Oxford: Blackwell. Chapter 1.
- \* Ralph Walker (1997). 'Theories of Truth' in Bob Hale and Crispin Wright (eds.), *A Companion to the Philosophy of Language*, 309-330. Oxford: Blackwell.
- \* Hartry Field (1994). 'Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content' *Mind* 103 (411):249-285.
- \* Bradley Armour-Garb (2012). 'Deflationism (About Theories of Truth)' *Philosophy Compass* 7 (4):267-277.
- \* Bradley Armour-Garb (2012). 'Challenges to Deflationary Theories of Truth' *Philosophy Compass* 7 (4):256-266.

*Question: Do correspondence theories or deflationary theories fare better when accounting for truth?*

## 10.2 Study Questions

- (1) What is the correspondence theory of truth?
- (2) To what might a true statement correspond?
- (3) Does the correspondence theory leave us unable to know anything about the world?
- (4) How might a correspondence theorist seek to handle statements of the form *it is not the case that all Fs are Gs*?
- (5) Why might having beliefs that resemble the world be a problematic account of correspondence?
- (6) Should we think of the correspondence theory of truth as a theory at all?
- (7) What is the redundancy theory of truth?
- (8) Can *is true* be deleted from statements of the form 'this sentence is true' without loss?
- (9) Can *is true* be deleted from statements of the form '*p* is true' without loss?
- (10) Is it correct to think that adding *is true* adds any force to an assertion that *p*?
- (11) Is there a difference between believing *p* and believing that *p is true*?
- (12) Does the liar paradox make a particular problem for the redundancy theory?
- (13) Does the liar paradox make a particular problem for the correspondence theory?
- (14) What do moral facts have to do with theories of truth?



## 11 Tutorial 6 – Conditionals

According to the traditional approach to propositional logic, indicative conditional statements have *truth functional* truth conditions. They are true whenever *either* the antecedent is true *or* the consequent is true. But this is often considered unintuitive. In this tutorial, we will think about whether the sticking points for this account of the truth conditions of conditionals justify its rejection and what we might say instead if we don't want to go with a traditional account.

### 11.1 Readings

- † Dorothy Edgington (2001). 'Conditionals' in Lou Goble (ed.), *The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic*, 385-414. Oxford: Blackwell.
- † Frank Jackson (1979). 'On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals' *Philosophical Review* 88 (4):565-589.
- † Robert C. Stalnaker (1968). 'A Theory of Conditionals' in J.W. Cornman (ed.), *Studies in Logical Theory*, 98-112. Oxford: Blackwell.
- \* Dorothy Edgington (1995). On Conditionals. *Mind* 104 (414):235-329.
- \* Jonathan Bennett (2003). *A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- \* David Lewis (1976). 'Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities' *Philosophical Review* 85 (3):297-315.
- \* Frank Jackson (1991). *Conditionals*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

*Question: Do indicative conditionals have truth conditions?*

## 11.2 Study Questions

## 12 Tutorial 7 – Vagueness

Think about a spectrum of different sized hill-like objects ranging from things that are clearly mountains to things that are clearly not. But inbetween, there are some objects that are neither clearly mountains nor clearly not mountains. The idea is that there are *vague* objects. And this has implications for logical reasoning. In this tutorial we will think about whether the possibility of objects that are neither clearly a hill, nor clearly not a hill pose problems that warrant the rejection of bivalence, the idea that any proposition is either true or false.

### 12.1 Readings

- † Matti Eklund (2007). ‘Characterizing Vagueness’ *Philosophy Compass* 2 (6):896-909.
- † Rosanna Keefe (2008). ‘Vagueness: Supervaluationism’ *Philosophy Compass* 3 (2):315-324.
- † Timothy Williamson (1994). *Vagueness*. London: Routledge. Chapter 7.
- \* Kit Fine (1975). ‘Vagueness, Truth and Logic’ *Synthese* 30 (3-4):265-300.
- \* Rosanna Keefe (2000). *Theories of Vagueness* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 7.
- \* Jonas Akerman (2012). ‘Contextualist Theories of Vagueness’ *Philosophy Compass* 7 (7):470-480.
- \* Peter Unger (1980). ‘The Problem of the Many’ *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 5:411-468.
- \* Robert Williams (2006). ‘An Argument for the Many’ *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 106 (1):411-419.

*Question: Does considering vagueness give us any reason to abandon the tenets of classical logic?*

## 12.2 Study Questions

- (1) What is the structure of a *sorites paradox*?
- (2) What difficulties are there in formulating the problem of vagueness?
- (3) Is the vagueness involved in concepts like *tall* different to the vagueness involved in objects like *the boundary of Everest*?
- (4) What does the logical possibility of something having a sharp boundary have to do with the actuality of it having a sharp boundary?
- (5) Does every concept admit borderline cases?
- (6) Is the epistemicist defence of classical logic just pigheadedness? Would abandoning it be just fine?
- (7) Does an appeal to a many-valued logic simply over-exacerbate the problem?
- (8) How does the analogy between precision and vagueness (on the one hand) and straight lines and circularity (on the other) work?
- (9) How can we calculate the truth value of a conjunction or a disjunction on this view?
- (10) Are calculations of truth values problematic where the truth value of  $p$  is 0.5?
- (11) What is the *hedging problem* for many-valued logics?
- (12) What are disambiguations on the supervaluationist picture?
- (13) In what ways is supervaluationism in conflict with classical logic?
- (14) What do supervaluationist theories think the truth value of  $X$  is *tall* is?
- (15) Does supervaluationism lead to scepticism about metaphysical objects?
- (16) How can supervaluationist theories make sense of the idea that a statement of the form *either  $X$  is tall or it's not the case that  $X$  is tall* is true?

## 13 Tutorial 8 – Modality

Modality becomes philosophically interesting when we consider that what is the case and what isn't the case doesn't seem to tell us the complete story about the world. Among the true things, there are things that are true and couldn't have been false and there are things that are true but could have been false. We'll think about what this difference amounts to and how we should think about this given that traditional classical logic does not differentiate between the two types of truth. We will also consider Quine's famous attack on modality.

### 13.1 Readings

- † W.V.O. Quine (1966). 'Three Grades of Modal Involvement' in W.V.O. Quine *The Ways of Paradox* New York: Random House.
- † W.V.O. Quine (1953). 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' in W.V.O. Quine *From a Logical Point of View* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press pp. 20-46.
- † Bob Hale (1997). 'Modality' in Bob Hale and Crispin Wright (eds.), *A Companion to the Philosophy of Language* New York: Blackwell, 487-514.
- \* Dagfinn Follesdal (2004). 'Quine on Modality' in Roger F. Gibson *The Cambridge Companion to Quine* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 8
- \* Joseph Melia (2003). *Modality* Chesham: Acumen. Chapter 3.
- \* Rod Girle (2000). *Modal Logics and Philosophy* Chesham: Acumen: Chapter 3.
- \* W.V.O. Quine (1953). 'Reference and Modality' in W.V.O. Quine *From a Logical Point of View* 139-159. Cambridge: Harvard University Press
- \* H.P. Grice & P.F. Strawson (1956). 'In Defence of a Dogma' *Philosophical Review* 65:141–158.

*Question: What are modal statements and are they meaningful?*

## 13.2 Study Questions

- (1) How does Quine's attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction go?
- (2) What are the two conclusions that Grice and Strawson identify?
- (3) Is their attempt to rebut the stronger conclusion successful?
- (4) What considerations to Grice and Strawson raise against the weaker conclusion?
- (5) What are the three grades of modal involvement that Quine identifies?
- (6) How do statement operators differ from predicates and what does this have to do with the three grades?
- (7) What is *referential opacity*?
- (8) How do *intensional* contexts differ from *extensional* ones?
- (9) What goes wrong between '9 is greater than 5' and 'the number of planets is greater than 5'?
- (10) Why does this not amount to a violation of extensionality, according to Quine?
- (11) What kinds of necessary truths does Quine consider acceptable under the 'Nec' predicate?
- (12) What is Aristotelian essentialism and what does it have to do with modality?
- (13) Does *de re* necessity depend on the way that something is presented and is this a problem for it?
- (14) What do referring expressions do other than refer to things?
- (15) How should we approach the idea that it is not essential to an object's properties the way it is conceived of?
- (16) Is the Quinean view altogether preferable to *conceptualism* or *non-empirical realism*?

## 14 Revision Reading

Here are two books that I would recommend to get you started on your revision. Both of them cover a good range of topics on the logic and language course and both go beyond the range of topics that we've looked at. They are primarily geared towards helping you remember what we've been talking about in tutorials, both in terms of the issues that we've been thinking about and the contours of the discussion that we've been having more generally. The first book is the following:

Bob Hale and Crispin Wright (eds.) (1997). *A Companion to the Philosophy of Language* Oxford: Blackwell.

Some of the readings during the course have been from the Hale and Wright volume. A number of the readings in this volume help give you an overall feel for what's at stake with the issues and a decent idea of who has said what in identifying the major positions.

A second book that I would recommend to get you started in revising for this paper is the following:

Michael Morris (2007). *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The Morris introduction is the single best introduction to the issues that we have been thinking about in the Philosophy of Logic and Language paper that we have been thinking about. It engages with some of the core reading and will help you to get a good overall view of what is going on in the core works that we've been thinking about. Unlike the Hale and Wright volume, the focus of the Morris piece isn't so much on range but more on depth. It therefore makes a good introduction to a limited range of the issues, but is an altogether useful volume nonetheless.