

AN ECUMENICAL EPISTEMOLOGY OF TESTIMONY

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- (1) The J-factors for a listener's belief in a speaker's testimony are the listener's reasons for thinking that the speaker's testimony is true.
- (2) The J-factors for a listener's belief in a speaker's testimony can be the speaker's J-factors for what she says.
- (3) The J-factors for a listener's belief in a speaker's testimony can be the factors that make a (set of) process(es) reliable.

The theory is grounded in the *anti-luck* tradition, whether this is understood in terms of reliability, safety, or sensitivity.

- (4) The J-factors for a listener's belief are the listener's reasons for thinking that the speaker's testimony is true only if the listener's belief is formed using her reasons for thinking that a speaker's testimony is true.
- (5) The J-factors for a listener's belief are the speaker's J-factors for what she says only if the listener's belief is formed through the presumption that the speaker has justification for what she says.
- (6) The J-factors for a listener's belief are the factors that make a (set of) process(es) reliable only if the listener's belief is formed through a presumption of reliability.

The idea is that the way that a listener responds connects her belief to a set of J-factors.

Internalist Theories. Endorse (1) and (4). Motivated by gullibility.

The objection: epistemic laundering and circular testimony.

Internalists claim that justification can be laundered through circular testimony.

The ecumenical theory doesn't have to claim this.

Transmission Theories. Endorse (2) and (5) combined with (1) and (4). These can handle circular testimony.

The objection: J-factors from additional safety.

Transmission theorists are unable to account for additional J-factors in the writer/farmer cases.

The ecumenical theory can accommodate these additional J-factors.

Reliabilist Theories. Endorse (3) and (6) (and think anything else will reduce into these).

The objection: how to individuate processes?

Reliabilist theories need to account for when one set of processes is the relevant one.

Using presumptions is the obvious way, but this is off-limits.

Conclusion. Each theory goes right in identifying a way of being justified (in terms of realising an anti-luck condition) but goes wrong in thinking that this is the *only* way for that condition to be satisfied.

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