Lying and Truth

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Abstract

This chapter explores the relationship between lying and truth. It begins with an overview of various inflationary and deflationary approaches to truth, before turning to the question of whether or not a speaker's testimony cannot be a lie if it is also true. It considers some of the intuitive cases that have been brought to bear on the relationship between lying and truth.

More specifically, the chapter is concerned with three ideas of the relationship between lying and truth. The first is the idea that a speaker's testimony is a lie only if it is false. The second is that a speaker's testimony is a lie only if it is believed to be false. The third is that a speaker's testimony is a lie only if it is something that the speaker does not believe.

1 Truth

If the ensuing debate is anything to go by, Pilate may well have been right not to wait for an answer. Philosophers have disagreed over truth in various different ways. Not always about the same thing. Some argue about the truth predicate, a linguistic expression. Others consider the concept of truth, which is something like our idea of truth, and still others discuss the property of truth, which is what the concept in our heads latches onto in the world.

Philosophers have also disagreed about what sorts of things are true, at least in the most fundamental sense. According to some, the bearers of truth are non-linguistic entities, such as propositions. According to those who take this approach, linguistic entities, such as sentences or utterances are true derivatively—in virtue of expression certain (true) propositions. But propositions might seem like metaphysically strange objects. The fact that they are probably abstract makes it difficult to say too much about them. With this in mind some treat linguistic entities, such as sentences or utterances, as the primary bearers of truth. There is, however, a case for thinking that we still need propositions to make sense of how two syntactically similar sentences can be semantically different, such as ‘the bank is 15 miles away’ in different contexts.

A central disagreement in discussions of truth concerns the question of whether or not truth is something substantial. Amongst those who think that there is, there are realist theories, which claim that truth is a matter of a truth-bearer standing in a particular relation to something in the world, and anti-realist theories, who dispute this. On the realist side, there are correspondence theories and truthmaker theories. On the anti-realist side, there are coherence theories and pragmatist theories.

Correspondence theories claim that, to say that something is true is to say that it corresponds to some fact. J.L. Austin [1950] and Bertrand Russell [1967] offer classic accounts of correspondence theories. The challenge for correspondence theorists is to spell out exactly what it means to say that something corresponds to a fact. Correspondence theorists need to do this in a way such that it is both informative and plausible. This can be difficult to do.
Truthmaker theorists take it that, rather than something being true in virtue of it corresponding to a fact, something is true if there exists something else that makes it true. Whilst truthmaker theories do not talk about correspondence and thus have no need of spelling out what correspondence to a fact must amount to, they have the related challenge of attempting to spell out in virtue of what something makes something else true. There is also the question, for truthmaker theories, of what sorts of things make other things true. They might be facts, or they might be states of affairs, or individual objects, or properties. These are questions for truthmaker theorists.

On the anti-realist side, coherence theories, such as the one endorsed by Donald Davidson [1989] claim that to say that something is true is just to say that it is part of a coherent set of beliefs. The question of what coherence amounts to is an obvious one, but it is also a difficult one for coherence theorists to find a convincing answer to. A set of beliefs being consistent is not enough for it to be coherent, but it is hard to see what other terms to put the notion of coherence in. One reason that consistency and coherence are not the same thing is that coherence admits degree, where consistency does not. Sets of beliefs are either consistent or they are not, but two sets of beliefs can both be coherent whilst one is more coherent than the other. The trouble is, it seems that truth is like consistency, in that it does not admit degree. This is a problem for the idea that truth and coherence go together.

Another anti-realist approach defines truth in pragmatist terms. What is true, according to this account, is what it is pragmatically good to believe. There are different accounts of what it might be pragmatically good for someone to believe, given by Peirce, James, Hilary Putnam [1981] and Michael Dummett [1978]. But equally, there seem to be cases that are fairly uncontroversially not pragmatically good. There is presumably a truth about the number of grains of sand on Miami Beach, but it does not seem that it could be in any way pragmatically useful for anyone to know it.

On the other hand, there are those who do not think that there is anything substantive to be said about truth. These deflationary approaches claim that there is nothing more to understanding truth than recognising the truth of the claim that, for any bearer of truth, the claim that it is true is equivalent to the claim itself. In other words, to say that ‘x is true’ is just to say that ‘x’ in some sense. Different deflationary ideas expand on this central theme in different ways.

For example, redundancy theories, of the type developed by Frank Ramsey [1927] take it that a statement of the form ‘x is true’ simply means the same thing as ‘x’. Equally, P.F. Strawson’s [1950] speech act theory sought to align an utterance of the form ‘x is true’ with an endorsement of ‘x’. An immediate worry with this kind of approach is that there seems to be more to truth than statements of the form ‘x is true.’ Statements such as ‘what she says is true’ or ‘what he says is not true’ do not appear to amount to the same thing as ‘what she says’ or ‘not what he says.’

A more recent deflationary approach is given by Paul Horwich [1998]. According to the minimalist theory that Horwich advocates, all that there is to understanding truth is to be disposed to accept biconditional statements of the form “x is true if and only if x”. In a similar spirit, Hartry Field [1994] claims that to understand truth is to treat statements of the form “x is true” as intersubstitutable with statements of the form ‘x’.

Whilst deflationary theories hold that statements of the form “x is true if and only if x” are, in some sense, all there is to understanding truth, this is not always to say that truth cannot be useful for anything else. As we have already seen, it can be useful for making generalisations, by saying that everything that someone says is true. Nonetheless, deflationary theories think that substantive definitions of truth are wrongheaded. The claim that “x is true if and only if x” is, of course, true for all truth theorists. But it is especially important for those who take deflationary approaches.

Pinning down a precise and specific theory of truth in the face of all of this is beyond the scope of this kind of discussion. But it seems that, for all of the argumentation over truth, we have some
intuitive sense of truth that will suffice for a discussion of the relationship between lying and truth.

2 Lying

Lies come in different varieties. According to many, the most obvious type is encapsulated in the following example from Jennifer Saul [2012]:

Case 1: Tony says that there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Tony in fact believes that there are no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, but wants to convince people that there are [Saul 2012, p. 6].

This type of lying is fairly straightforward to understand. It is a case in which a speaker says something that she believes to be false to a listener with the intention of having the listener take her word for it and believe what she says because she said it. An obvious account of lying comes immediately out of this and takes it that all lies are statements where the speaker believes that what she says is false and seeks to have the listener take her word for it.¹ Unfortunately, however, not all lies are straightforwardly instances of this type. In particular, the following case from Thomas Carson [2006] does not have this structure:

Case 2: A student is caught cheating on an exam and is brought before the Dean. The student knows that the Dean is fully aware that she was cheating on the exam and nothing that she can say will affect this. She also knows, however, that the Dean only punishes people when they confess to cheating. So the student says that she did not cheat on the exam [Carson 2010, p. 21].

These two cases are both intuitively lies.² Whilst they are dissimilar in one important sense—the speaker in Case 1 seeks to be believed by his audience whereas the speaker in Case 2 does not seek to be believed by the listener—they are similar in another sense. Both cases involve a statement of something believed by the speaker to be false. It seems that there is an obvious that there is a connection between lying and falsity. The question at the centre of this discussion concerns how to account for this connection. There are, as I see it, three obvious accounts of how to account for the connection between lying and truth:

(1) A speaker’s statement is a lie only if the speaker’s statement is false.

(2) A speaker’s statement is a lie only if the speaker believes that her statement is false.

(3) A speaker’s statement is a lie only if the speaker does not believe what she says.

The first thing to note is that (1) gives an objective account of the connection between truth and falsity, where (2) and (3) respectively give subjective accounts of the connection. The idea is that (1) states that a speaker’s statement is a lie only if what she says is in fact false. Regardless of whether or not the speaker believes that what she says is false, if what she says is in fact true, then the speaker’s statement is not a lie. According to (2) and (3) respectively, the speaker’s beliefs about whether or not what she says is false matter for the question of whether or not what she says is a lie. Specifically,

¹This account of lying or something like it is given by Bok [1978], Davidson [1985], Frankfurt [1988], Kupfer [1982], Primoratz [1984] and Williams [2002]. The discussion is framed in terms of statements rather than assertions to avoid an unnecessary controversy of what is involved in asserting. See Stokke [2013].

²Against the claim that Case 2 is an instance of a lie, see Mahon [2008] and Melbauer [2011].
if the speaker believes that what she says is true (even if she is wrong about this) then her statement is not a lie.

It is important to note that (1), (2) and (3) are not all mutually exclusive. Firstly, one might conjoin (1) with (2) to get the following account of the connection between lying and falsity:

(4) A speaker’s statement is a lie only if the speaker’s statement is false and the speaker believes that her statement is false.

According to this account, the connection between lying and falsity is such that the speaker’s statement being either true or believed by the speaker to be true prevents it from being a lie. Equally one might conjoin (1) with (3) to get the view that a speaker’s statement is a lie only if the speaker’s statement is false and the speaker does not believe what she says. Since I am not aware of anyone who endorses such an account, I will leave this view aside for the purposes of this discussion. It is also important to be clear that (2) implies (3). A speaker believing that what she says is false implies that she does not believe what she says. In spite of this, however, (2) and (3) should be understood as competing accounts of the connection between lying and falsity. It is therefore worth making explicit the terms of the engagement here. Defending (3) as an account of the connection between lying and falsity involves claiming that there are instances of lying such that the speaker does not believe what she says, but equally does not believe that what she says is false. Endorsing (2) involves claiming that there are no such cases. Whilst it is strictly and literally true that (2) implies (3) and therefore that endorsing (2) involves endorsing (3), the theories for the purposes of this discussion should be understood as distinct and in competition with one another.

With an initial overview of the terrain in hand, I will turn to discuss each of the accounts of the connection between lying and falsity in turn. Rather than seeking to draw sharp conclusions about the viability of each of the above accounts, I will offer an overview of some of the considerations that might be brought to bear against each account and leave it to the reader to draw her own conclusions.

3 Saying What is False

First, consider the objective account of the connection between lying and falsity, encapsulated in the claim that:

(1) A speaker’s statement is a lie only if the speaker’s statement is false.

The most prominent defence of (1) comes from Carson [2010]. As observed in the introduction, however, the objective statement of the connection between lies and falsity given in (1) can be conjoined with either of the subjective accounts given in (2) and (3). And Carson seeks to conjoin (1) with (2) as described above, to give the following account:

(4) A speaker’s statement is a lie only if the speaker’s statement is false and the speaker believes that her statement is false.

According to Carson ‘all lies are false statements, but not all false statements are lies’ [Carson 2010, p. 17]. In support of this, Carson gives the following the case:

Case 3: You and I go fishing and each of us catches a fish. I catch a big fish and you catch a smaller one. Unfortunately, our lines become crossed so that it appears that you caught a big fish and I caught a smaller one. I therefore believe that I caught a small fish. When I go home, I decide to say that I caught a big fish, even though I don’t believe this [Carson 2010, p. 16].
According to Carson, it is intuitive that the statement in this case is not a lie. Insofar as one shares this intuition, this seems to provide evidence for the objective connection between lying and falsity given in (4). It seems that the only reason that the above statement could fail to count as a lie is because of a problem with the connection between lying and falsity.

Carson offers a further observation in support of the objective connection between lying and falsity given in (4). Consider the following case:

**Case 4:** I tell you that Jesus College was founded in 1571 and you accuse me of lying. Later, you find out independently that Jesus College was in fact founded in 1571.

Carson notes that it seems that, in such a situation, you should withdraw your accusation that I was lying. But all that you find out in Case 4 is that my statement is in fact true. You don’t find out that I believed it to be true and you don’t find out anything about what I believed.

This means that the intuition that you ought to withdraw your accusation that I was lying speaks in favour of an objective connection between lying and falsity. It’s important that you find out about the truth of what I said by establishing it independently, rather than having me present you with the evidence for it. If I presented you with the evidence for the truth of what I said, one might think that this presents you with evidence for thinking that I didn’t say something that I don’t believe. And this would diminish the force of the case in establishing an objective connection between lying and falsity, as Carson hopes to.

If your evidence that what I say is true comes from me, then the intuition that it’s inappropriate to accuse me of lying can be explained away merely in terms of a subjective connection between lying and falsity. It becomes far from clear that I said something that I believed to be false and this by itself is enough to make it inappropriate for you to accuse me of lying. You finding out for yourself that what I said was true makes it harder for someone denying an objective connection between lying and falsity to characterise the situation.

Furthermore, it seems as though the observation here might well generalise. In Carson’s words: ‘[s]howing that a statement is true is always sufficient to counter the accusation that one has told a lie’ [Carson 2010, p. 16]. This, I think, is the main case for thinking that there’s an objective connection between lying and falsity. The case can be formulated into two arguments. The first argument goes as follows:

(i) The statement in Case 3 is not a lie.

(ii) If the statement in Case 3 is not a lie, then this is because saying something false is a necessary condition of lying.

Therefore

(iii) Saying something false is a necessary condition of lying.

The second argument can be summarised as follows:

(iv) In Case 4, it is inappropriate to accuse the speaker of lying.

(v) This inappropriateness can only be explained in terms of saying something false being a necessary condition of lying.

Therefore

(vi) Saying something false is a necessary condition of lying.
Both arguments are intuition-driven. Premise (i) in the first argument and premise (iv) in the second argument rely on intuitions. And one might think that these intuitions are inconclusive at best. I myself don’t feel the intuition supporting (i) particularly strongly. But more generally, one might think that there are equally intuitive cases that push in the opposite direction. Consider again Case 1 in which Tony intuitively lies about there being weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, by saying that there are such weapons whilst believing falsely that there are not. Insofar as it is intuitive that Tony’s statement in Case 1 is a lie, this exerts pressure on the connection between lying and falsity given in (4).

Case 1*: Tony says that there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Tony in fact believes that there are no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, but wants to convince people that there are. Unbeknownst to Tony, however, there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq [Saul 2012, p. 6].

The fact that (4) is a conjunction of both (1) and (2) can make things a little unclear. In arguing against (4) we need to be clear whether we a reason for rejecting (4) is a reason for rejecting (1) only, or a reason for rejecting (2) only, or a reason for rejecting both. It is clear, however, that the situation in Case 1 exerts pressure on (4) because it is an instance of lying that fails to be false. Whilst Tony believes that there are no weapons of mass destruction there are in fact such weapons. Insofar as it is intuitive that Tony’s statement in Case 1 is a lie, the situation in Case 1 exerts pressure on the objective component of (4) rather than the subjective component.

The dialectic here becomes a dispute over intuitions and I do not have much to add. I leave it to the reader to assess for herself the case for an objective connection between lying and falsity in the form of a speaker’s statement being false as a necessary condition of it being a lie. It is worth noting, however, that one fact that might be decisive is that, according to those who defend the indispensability of an objective connection, it is possible for a speaker to try, but fail, to lie. Insofar as this seems impossible, we might think that an objective connection between the speaker’s statement and its falsity is unnecessary.

With this in hand, let us consider the second argument. The second argument is motivated by the observation that finding out the speaker’s statement is true makes it appropriate to withdraw the accusation that the speaker’s statement is a lie. One might think, however, that the intuitions here need to be distilled more carefully before any substantive conclusions can be drawn from them. Once these are distilled further, I think that the argument faces a dilemma. The question is whether or not you have any special reason to believe that my statement in Case 2 expresses something that I believe to be false.

If it isn’t the case that you have any such reason, then the intuition that you ought to withdraw the assertion that I was lying is neutral between those who endorse an objective connection between lying and falsity and those who merely endorse a subjective connection. Finding out that what I said is true removes your evidence for thinking that I believed what I said to be false. As a result, those who endorse a subjective account of the connection between lying and falsity can claim that it seems that you ought to withdraw your accusation because you have no reason for thinking that I was lying. Specifically, you have no reason for thinking that I didn’t believe what I said and this is a necessary condition of lying. Your accusation is thus unsubstantiated and you ought to withdraw it.

On the other hand, if it is the case that you have some other reason for thinking that I didn’t believe what I said, then a defender of a merely subjective connection between lying and falsity cannot explain the idea that you ought to withdraw your claim that I was lying. However, if it is the case that you have some other reason for thinking that I didn’t believe what I said, then it isn’t as clear that you
really ought to withdraw the claim. It might seem far less obvious that my statement was not a lie. If you have reason to think that, the truth of my statement notwithstanding, I didn’t believe it, then it becomes far less obvious that you ought to withdraw the accusation after all.

4 Saying What One Believes to be False

The second account of the connection between lying and falsity given above sought to characterise the connection between in the following terms:

(2) A speaker’s statement is a lie only if the speaker believes that her statement is false.

This account is by far the most popular in the contemporary literature. It is endorsed by Don Fallis [2009], Jennifer Lackey [2013], Jennifer Saul [2012] and Andreas Stokke [2013]. Understanding what (2) amounts to involves understanding how it differs from various nearby propositions. A *locus classicus* in the philosophical literature on lying by Roderick Chisholm and Thomas Feehan [1977] helps bring out exactly what is meant by a speaker saying something that she believes to be false.

In a case where someone says that Jesus College is on fire, Chisholm and Feehan seek to distinguish between the following:

(i) The speaker not believing that Jesus College is on fire and also not believing that Jesus College is not on fire.

(ii) The speaker believing that Jesus College is not on fire.

(iii) The speaker believing that it is not true that Jesus College is on fire.

(iv) The speaker believing that it is false that Jesus College is on fire.

Possibly the most important distinction for understanding what the claim that a speaker’s statement is a lie only if the speaker says something she believes to be false involves is the distinction between (ii) and (iv). The main difference that Chisholm and Feehan identify between (ii) and (iv) is that in the situation that (ii) describes, the speaker’s statement expresses the negation of something that she believes whereas in (iv), the speaker has what Chisholm and Feehan identify as a *second-level attitude* towards the proposition that Jesus College is on fire.

The central idea is that (iv) involves a level of cognitive sophistication that (ii) does not. For the truth of condition (ii) requires only the speaker having a conception of Jesus College and what it would be for it to be on fire. By contrast, the truth of condition (iv) requires the speaker have the additional concept of a proposition and of something *being false* [Chisholm & Feehan 1977, p. 147]. The need to grasp the additional concept of something being false means that this requires an additional understanding, or level of cognitive sophistication.

Chisholm and Feehan ultimately endorse an account of the connection between lying and truth according to which a speaker’s statement is a lie only if it is *either* a statement that the speaker believes

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3Chisholm and Feehan do not themselves endorse (2) but endorse the related claim that:

(5) A speaker’s statement is a lie only if the speaker believes what she says to not be true or she believes what she says to be false.

Since I think that the plausibility of (5) goes along with the plausibility of (2) for the purposes of this discussion, I will not discuss (5) separately.
to be not true, or else a statement that the speaker believes to be false [Chisholm & Feehan 1977, p. 152]. This means that a speaker's statement can be a lie only if the speaker has a conception of truth and falsity and a conception of what a proposition is. The account of lying given by Don Fallis (2009) claims that a speaker lies to a listener only if the speaker believes that what she says is false. Likewise, Andreas Stokke [2013] claims that a speaker's statement is a lie only if the speaker believes that it is false. And Jennifer Lackey [2013] offers an account of lying according to which a speaker believing that what she says is false is a necessary condition of the speaker's statement being a lie.

Each of these accounts thus claims that lying requires a certain sophistication. It requires the speaker to have a concept of falsity (or, in the case of Chisholm and Feehan’s theory, truth). Insofar as we can distinguish between someone saying that Jesus College is on fire whilst believing that Jesus College is not on fire and someone saying that Jesus College is on fire whilst believing that it’s false that Jesus College is on fire, the kind of accounts under consideration here claim that the former does not exhibit the kind of connection between lying and falsity required for lying.

Against this view, one might think that it gives an overly-intellectual account of what it is to lie to someone. More specifically, insofar as believing that Jesus College is not on fire and believing that it’s false that Jesus College is on fire can come apart, one might wonder whether someone who believes the former but not the latter might be in a position to lie to a speaker. It would seem that a speaker who states that Jesus College is on fire whilst believing that it isn’t is being dishonest in the way that one might usually associate with lying. Consider again the situation in Case 3, which was supposed to be a straightforward instance of a lie. As it is currently set out, Tony says that there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq whilst believing the negation of this—that there are no such weapons. Nothing in Case 3 as it is currently set out claims that Tony believes that it is false that there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

This means that, insofar as it is intuitive that Tony’s statement in Case 3 is a lie, there is a reason for thinking that a speaker’s testimony can be a lie even if it is not the case that the speaker believes that what she says is false. It seems that, as far as the connection between lying and falsity is concerned, the fact that Tony believes the negation of what he says is sufficient for his statement to be a lie (assuming the other conditions on lying are met). On the face of it, then, this kind of case makes trouble for the idea that a speaker’s statement is a lie only if the speaker believes that what she says is false. Nothing in Case 3 proves that Tony has the second-level attitude necessary for lying according to the popular account of the connection between lying and falsity.

By way of a response, one might suggest that, at least ordinarily, we assume that mature human adults do have a conception of truth and falsity and consequently, unless there is some reason to think that the speaker doesn’t have such a conception, then it seems reasonable to move from the observation that the speaker believes the negation of what she says to the conclusion that the speaker believes that what she says is false. So the idea is that the fact that Tony believes that there are no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq is evidence that Tony believes that it is false that there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

As a way of circumventing this kind of response, we might turn our attention to the following case:

**Case 5**: Alice believes that Jesus College is not on fire. She sees that there is smoke coming from the direction of Jesus College, but she also sees that the smoke is not coming from the college itself. As well as this, Alice lacks the second-level belief that it is false that Jesus College is on fire, but she does have the relevant conceptual sophistication to believe that Jesus College is not on fire. Upon being asked whether or not Jesus College is on fire, however, she says that it is.
This, I think, generates an intuitive difficulty for theories of lying that take it that the connection between lying and falsity, involves the speaker believing that what she says is false, as described in (3). Insofar as the observation from Chisholm and Feehan that one might believe that Jesus College is not on fire whilst failing to believe that it is false that Jesus College is on fire is correct, the situation described in Case 5 should represent a genuine possibility.

In such a situation, however, I think it’s far from clear that Alice cannot be lying when she says that Jesus College is on fire. It certainly seems that Alice’s testimony is deceptive, in that it expresses something that she believes the opposite of and furthermore, we might stipulate that Alice’s testimony is intended to get the person asking her to believe that Jesus College is not on fire. The situation in Case 5 seems to be clearly different from a case in which Alice merely misleads the listener by saying, for instance, that she saw smoke coming from the direction of Jesus College intending to induce the belief that Jesus College is on fire. Rather, she says that Jesus College is on fire with the intention of inducing that same belief. In other words, the situation in Case 5 does not seem to clearly resemble a case of misleading more than a case of lying.

One suggestion might be that lying involves asserting, which requires an adequate grasp of truth and falsity. The idea that asserting requires this kind of sophistication is indicated in Michael Dummett’s [2011] discussion. This, however, is part of the reason that I have been trying to steer around discussions of assertion in this chapter and focus at the level of stating.

The distinction between believing that something is false and believing that its negation is true seems to indicate that someone can lie without saying something that she believes to be false. Assuming that Alice has a conception of what it would require for Jesus College to be on fire and a conception of what it would require for Jesus College to not be on fire, she can be aware that the latter is the case and aware that she says that the former is the case. Even without a second-level conception of what it is for something to be true, it seems that Alice can lie by believing that Jesus College is not on fire but saying that it is. This, I think, exerts intuitive force against the account of the connection between lying and falsity given in (2).

5 Saying What One Does Not Believe

A final account of the connection between lying and falsity comes in the form of the view expressed in (3) according to which:

(3) A speaker’s statement is a lie only if the speaker doesn’t believe it.

The view expressed in (3) features in Sorensen’s [2007] account of lying. According to Sorensen, to lie is to assert what one does not believe. It’s immediately clear that the view given in (3) handles the considerations brought against the view given in (2) by Case 5 relatively well. For in a case where Alice believes that Jesus College is on fire and says that Jesus College is not on fire, it is clear that Alice does not believe that Jesus College is not on fire. Hence the account in (3) coheres with the intuition that Alice’s statement is a lie. Whilst she doesn’t believe that what she says is false, she equally doesn’t believe it.

Where the view given in (2) seemed restrictive, in that it leads to a very narrow account of which statements are lies, the view given in (3) is altogether more permissive. The worry, however, is that it might be altogether too permissive. Where (2) claims that statements that intuitively seem like they might be lies are in fact not lies, one might think that (3) claims that statements that do not intuitively seem like lies are in fact lies.
An obvious case of this might seem to be where someone engages in metaphor or hyperbole. In saying *she's on fire today*, to make the point that the person in question is having a particularly successful day, one might not believe that the person in question is literally on fire, but nonetheless, it doesn’t seem that someone who says *she’s on fire today* is thereby lying. The reason that this kind of case does not count as lying, according to Sorensen’s view, is that whilst it might meet the relevant untruthfulness condition, it does not meet the other conditions necessary for lying. According to Sorensen, statements of this kind lack the relevant sort of assertoric force [Sorensen 2007, p. 256].

This seems like the correct thing to say about metaphor and hyperbole. When they are used, the associated statements are not lies, but this is not necessarily because they fail the untruthfulness condition. Indeed, one might think of metaphor and hyperbole as a way of doing something very similar to lying, but without actually lying. Nonetheless, even if metaphor and hyperbole should not intuitively be classified as lying, one might think that there are similar cases that are not so easily handled by the view that the connection between lying and truth is the one given in (3). We might consider the following case:

**Case 6**: Chloe thinks it is highly probable that the next flight to Oslo has a stopover in London. When asked by a friend whether or not the next flight to Oslo has a stopover in London, however, Chloe says that it does.

In **Case 6**, two things seem to be the case. The first is that Chloe doesn’t believe that the flight in question will have a stopover. Rather, she believes that it is highly probable that it will probably have a stopover. To believe that something will probably happen is distinct from believing that it will happen. And insofar as Chloe might believe that the flight will probably have a stopover rather than simply that the flight has a stopover, it seems that her saying that the flight has a stopover involves her expressing something that she doesn’t believe.

Against this, one might note that, actually, it is not so much the case that Chloe does not believe that the flight has a stopover in London, but that she does not believe it strongly enough to justify asserting it. In this situation, it would seem that she is not lying, according to (3). This presents a challenge to this kind of view, though the exact strength of the challenge depends on exactly how far believing that something will happen can be differentiated from believing that something will probably happen.

The second thing to note is that, unlike cases of metaphor and hyperbole, it is far from clear that Chloe’s assertion lacks the kind of assertoric force required to make it a lie. It might well be that her assertion is entirely serious and intended to induce the belief in her friend that the next flight to Oslo does have a stopover in London. It thus seems that, according to the account of the connection between lying and falsity given in (3), Chloe’s statement might well be considered as a lie. At any rate, there seems to be no immediately obvious reason to discount it from being one.

One might think, however, that Chloe’s statement in (3) is not a lie. This intuition can be brought out further by considering the fact that, whilst she is stating something that she does not believe and intending for her friend to come to believe it, she is not seeking to deceive her friend into believing something that she thinks is false, since Chloe does not believe that it is false that the next flight to Oslo has a stopover in London. Nor is she seeking to be deceptive in saying that the next flight to Oslo has a stopover in London, since she is not obviously trying to withhold or conceal evidence relevant to the question of whether or not the next flight to London has a stopover in Oslo. In this way, Chloe’s statement lacks the usual characteristics of a lie.

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*On the possibility of metaphor and hyperbole being properly classified as lies, see Carson [2010] and Meibauer [2014].*
Furthermore, it seems that Chloe's statement lacks the usual characteristics of a lie in a way that cannot simply be explained in terms of the statement failing to have a certain kind of assertoric force. Insofar as it is intuitive that Chloe's statement is not a lie even if she intends to have her friend take her word for it, that the next flight to Oslo will have a stopover in London, her statement has all the assertoric force commonly associated with lies. Nonetheless, we might find it intuitive that the statement is not a lie.

In any event, it seems relatively clear that Chloe’s statement is different to ordinary instances of lies, such as the one given in Case 1. Ordinarily, as Lackey observes, lying is associated with seeking to deceive, or with otherwise being deceptive. The result is that, if Chloe’s statement is a lie in virtue of the fact that she asserts it with the right force and does not believe it (rather than believing it to be false, or believing the opposite of it), then it is a lie of a different type to the paradigm cases of lying. Of course this is not, by itself, sufficient to make the case to the conclusion that Chloe’s statement in Case 6 is not a lie. Bald-faced lies, in which a speaker intuitively lies to a listener but without seeking to have the listener believe what she says are unlike paradigm cases of lying in important ways, but this does not in any sense make it intuitive that they are not lies. But Chloe’s statement in Case 6 differs from a case of bald-faced lying because in the case of bald-faced lies, there is a strong intuition that such statements are in fact lies. Insofar as there is an intuition that Chloe’s statement in Case 6 is a lie, it is, I think, an altogether less strong one. And insofar as this is a less strong intuition, there is pressure to be exerted on the connection between lying and falsity given in (3).

References


